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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CITIZENSHIP
Peter J. Spiro*
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE,
AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. By T. Alexander Aleinikoff Cambridge
and London: Harvard University Press. 2002. Pp. xi, 306. $45.

INTRODUCTION

These are interesting times at the constitutional margins.
Questions about where the Constitution takes up and leaves off are
more frequently in play; one can no longer so readily assume the
Constitution to supply an authoritative metric as we confront promi
nent cases of nonapplication. At the same time, the increasing robust
ness of international norms has prompted a vigorous reconsideration
of their relationship to domestic ones. Where the twentieth century
was marked by deep segmentation among national legal regimes, with
minimal transboundary interpenetration, recent years have seen the
advent of complex, overlapping regimes: subnational, national,
regional, and global, public and private. Sorting out these regimes, and
finding the place of the Constitution among them, poses a founda
tional challenge for America's constitutional future.
These questions have until recent years also been at the margins in
the academy, where they have not attracted much direct scholarly
inquiry. As in related disciplines, constitutional theory has taken the
state and the national community as exogenous quantities, whose
edges are (in effect) assumed congruent with those of the universe.
Straddling contexts have long been absent from the constitutional
canon. The academic mainstream has, for instance, taken little interest
in the constitutional puzzles of immigration and international law.
Scholars in those and related areas have suffered a sort of stepchild
status among constitutional-law theorists, their concerns dismissed as
constitutional anomalies rather than studied as constitutional keys.
That sort of marginalization is a thing of the past, as major consti
tutional thinkers begin to map the possibilities of the new order. T.
Alexander Aleinikoff's1 Semblances of Sovereignty will surely count as
* Professor, Hofstra University Law School. B.A. 1 982, Harvard; J.D. 1987, University
of Virginia. - Ed. Thanks to Gerald Neuman, Kai Raustiala, a nd Peter Schuck for helpful
comments.

1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
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an early classic of the revived interest in constitutional borderlands.2
Not since the turn of the last century, when the nation faced the
constitutional quandaries of colonial possessions, has such attention
been devoted to demarcating the constitutional community. Parallel to
the increasingly intensive contestedness of the place of international
law in the constitutional order,3 this work considers, as Aleinikoff
puts it, " [e]xactly who We the People are" (p. 4). The debate
is foregrounding those groups whose constitutional status has long
been uncertain, most notably, residents of Puerto Rico and other
"unincorporated" territories,4 members of Native American tribes,5
and aliens.6 All three have been historically subordinated as a matter
of constitutional class; that is, they have as a categorical matter been
denied full constitutional protections.7 To this day, the constitutional
2. Gerald Neuman's Strangers to the Constitution represents the other most important
offering in the area to date. See GERA LD L. NEUMAN , STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
3. This debate has been fueled by the rise of a sovereigntist school of foreign relations
law scholars who have challenged longstanding assumptions (at least in the academy) of the
status of international law in the constitutional order. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and
the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 653 n.16 (2002) (surveying recent
foreign relations law commentary); Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary Interna
tional Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815 (1997), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824, 1856-57 (1998), and Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and-Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
371 , 377-80 (1997).
4. See, e.g., FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) [hereinaf
ter FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE] (including contributions from among others Sanford
Levinson, Gerald Neuman, and Mark Tushnet); Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should
be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31
(1996); Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1993); Symposium, Native Americans and the Constitution, 5 U. PA.
]. CONST. L. 219 (2003).
6. Significant scholarly attention has considered the constitutional place of aliens
through the modern era, in large part because the doctrine here is so ostentatiously out of
step with prevailing constitutional values. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Con
gressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1985); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984). Nonetheless, as Neuman observes,
"(i]mmigration law has become an isolated specialty within American law, where normal
constitutional reasoning does not necessarily apply." NEUMAN, supra note 2, at 13; see also
PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000) (casebook devoting considerable attention to constitutional law
relating to Native Americans, the territories, and aliens).
7. For a historical account of the entangled constitutional status of all three groups, see
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEXAS L. REV. I
(2002).
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circle has been drawn so as to qualify the inclusion of these groups.
Scholars are now taking aim at these status differentials, setting the
stage, perhaps, for the next chapter in the rights revolution.
Aleinikoff's work is central to this emerging discourse,8 and
Semblances of Sovereignty skillfully distills the doctrinal contradictions
of constitutional subordination. In Aleinikoff's view, citizenship
supplies both the explanation for and the answer to this subordination.
Citizenship has been a powerfully equalizing force in the American
constitutional tradition for those within the circle. Insofar as rights
have been made contingent on citizenship status, however, those
outside are left without constitutional armor. Aleinikoff suggests a
reconception of citizenship, extending core constitutional status to
those for whom citizenship is not a constitutional entitlement (namely,
Native Americans and territorial residents) as well as to some who are
not citizens at all (permanent resident aliens). Thus redrawing the line
would roll back the plenary power doctrine, a strategy of constitu
tional avoidance under which the judiciary has demurred to political
authorities in the treatment of these groups. At the same time, the
new citizenship would respect self-determination norms in the consti
tutional recognition of such subnational groups as "sovereign" tribal
and territorial communities. This vision, in the end, "figure[s] citizen
ship as commitment, not privilege, and view[s] sovereignty as
empowerment, not domination" (p. 10).
With citizenship as a baseline, the argument is a powerful one. But
one might at a more fundamental level question the continuing utility
of that baseline and of citizenship as an institution. An emergent body
of "postnational" scholarship is challenging citizenship and the nation
state as delimitations of human community, posing instead diasporas,
social movements, and other nonstate groupings as competing loca
tions of identity and governance. Aleinikoff brackets the postnational
assault; he is seeking to transform citizenship, not transcend it
(pp. 9-10). In this respect, the analysis presents more of an exercise in
recentering citizenship than - as claimed - one of "decenter[ing]" it
(p. 179). But the postnational challenge is unavoidably implicated in
any attempt to deploy citizenship as an institutional vehicle. Even as
an expansive and benign quantity, Aleinikoff's vision of citizenship
may suffer the same problems as its exclusionary predecessors:
8. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution,
7 CONST. COMMENT. 9 (1 990); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Studies in Constitutional
Law: A Comment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2000). Aleinikoff is also a major figure in the
study of citizenship law and policy, heading up a multivolume study for the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. See CITIZENSHIP POLICIES FOR AN AGE OF
MIGRATION (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas B. Klusmeyer eds., 2002); CITIZENSHIP
TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas
Klusmeyer eds., 2001) [hereinafter CITIZENSHIP TODAY]; FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS:
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer
eds., 2000).
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however the circle is drawn, many are left out, including many with
deep attachments to the national community. To the extent, on the
other hand, that the circle is drawn ever more widely, the tie that
citizenship is understood to represent grows ever thinner. This
dynamic would seem to present an inescapable dilemma for the insti
tution of liberal citizenship, and perhaps for liberalism itself.
l.

LIBERAL NATIONALISM AND EQUALITY

The notion of equal citizenship has been central to the dominant
liberal vision of America, a vision that (the label's political implication
notwithstanding) spans the political mainstream.9 Equality is the
metric of constitutional policy. There is perhaps no more effective way
to tar a political position than to link it with some putative "second
class citizenship." This reflex, of course, has deep roots in American
constitutional tradition, back to the express constitutional prohibition
on titles of nobility.10 More recently it was a central theme in the civil
rights movement. The extension of citizenship by itself, accomplished
after the Civil War, meant nothing insofar as some citizens faced
continuing legal subordination. But the cause remained citizenship
oriented, focused on vindicating rather than reframing the equal
citizenship norm. In this account, Brown v. Board of Education was
broadly speaking a case about citizenship (p. 39). Indeed, Aleinikoff
locates citizenship at the center of Warren Court jurisprudence.
Vaunted as "the right to have rights,"11 citizenship became the vehicle
for expanding constitutional entitlements. The status of citizenship
was itself afforded enhanced judicial protection, as the Court
constrained the government's power to terminate citizenship against
an individual's will.12 Citizenship also became a portable status, in the

9. As Aleinikoff writes elsewhere, citizenship is "a kind of neutral social glue" that ap
peals to both the political left and right. "The concept is identified with a set of shared values
- liberty, equality, and tolerance - that stand above racial, economic, and social groups."
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1689, 1689 (2001).
1 0. U.S. CONST. art. 1 , § 9 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall. without the Consent
of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
from any King, Prince or foreign State."). Naturalization applicants are still required to re
nounce titles of nobility as a condition of acquisition of U.S. citizenship. See 8 U.S.C §
1448(b) (2003).
11. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
12. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (finding use of expatriation as punishment in
consistent with Eighth Amendment protections). Although a sharply divided Court in Perez
upheld the government's power to expatriate citizens for undertaking various voluntary acts
even where such acts were not specifically intended as renuciatory, over an agitated dissent
by Chief Justice Warren, that decision was overturned a decade later in A froyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967).
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sense that associated rights traveled with the citizen regardless of
location.13
As others have recognized,14 the Court's citizenship strategy
succeeded in elevating the place of those who had been subordinated
within the community. But almost by its terms, citizenship could not
do the same work for those lacking the status. In Aleinikoff's view,
this explains the Warren Court's failure to advance significantly the
rights of aliens15 - a ball moved forward only once the citizenship
theme had been abandoned by the Burger Court.16 Aleinikoff suggests
that the Court's citizenship discourse may also have impeded
any inclination to reverse the Insular Cases
under which only
"fundamental" constitutional rights were held to apply in "unincorpo
rated" territories17 - owing to the anomalous, nonconstitutional citi
zenship status of those born in the territories.18 Likewise with Native
Americans, whose citizenship had also only been secured by statute;19
"the Court may have believed that Indians would become full citizens
when they cast aside their dependent status and took their place
among other citizens of the United States and the states in which they
resided" (p. 52). Moreover, in the Native American context, the equal
citizenship principle provided no clear answers, insofar as tribal
autonomy and antisubordination norms could conflict. Where incor-

13. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. l (1 957) (finding Bill of Rights applicable to extra
territorial U.S. government prosecutions of U.S. citizens).
14. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. , STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. l (1977).
15. See pp. 47-49; see also, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 1 18, 123 (1967) (upholding
immigration bar on the entry of homosexuals into the United States as against vagueness
challenge; "[tjhe constitutional requirement of fair warning has no applicability to stan
dards . . . for admission of aliens to the United States").
16. The Burger Court arguably advanced the position of aliens, at least outside of the
immigration context, most notably by designating alienage as a "suspect classification" that
triggered heightened scrutiny of state laws as against equal protection challenges. See Gra
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
17. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922); Downes v. Bidwell, 1 82 U.S. 244 (1 901); see also Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The
Statlls of Our New Possessions - A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 1 55 (1899) (devising the

incorporated/unincorporated distinction).
18. Pp. 49-53; Jones Act. ch. 45, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified at 8 U.S. C. § 1402 (2000))
(extending citizenship to persons born in Puerto Rico). Aleinikoff observes that perfecting
the constitutional status of territorial residents "might well have become fertile ground for
the Warren Court's citizenship project"; he speculates that the failure to plough may have
owed to a "preoccup[ation] with the race question and the expansion of rights against the
states." Pp. 49-53. Given the opportunity, the Warren Court failed to cut back on the Insular
Cases. See Covert, 354 U.S. at 14.
19. See Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1401(b) (2000)) (extending citizenship to all Native Americans born within the territorial
United States); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (finding members of Native American

tribes not within the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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poration of the Bill of Rights made sense as against the states, for
example, it raised potentially more troublesome issues as against tribal
self-government.
The result has been a sort of constitutional limbo for all three
groups, the common doctrinal strand being the plenary power
doctrine. Under plenary power, the courts have passed on their usual
constitutional review functions, and the political branches are left free
to act unchecked by anything more than the most cursory judicial
oversight. Plenary power has no doubt reduced the constitutional
position of these groups, for it effectively takes the Constitution off
the table, at least as a judicial starting point. It also deprives them as
communities of a potential institutional ally in their dealings with the
political branches. In the context of rights, it means, for instance, that
differential federal benefits schemes more readily withstand constitu
tional challenge. Puerto Ricans are denied some benefits programs
altogether and face lower benefit scales in others;20 many aliens, even
legal resident aliens, remain ineligible for certain benefits even as cuts
from the 1996 Welfare Reform Act have been restored.21 Native
American tribes and Puerto Rico have also faced various constraints
on their self-government capacities. On this score, Aleinikoff high
lights the failure to afford Native American tribes jurisdiction over
tribal nonmembers present in reservation territory (pp. 99-121 ).
Plenary power takes on perhaps its harshest guise with respect to the
place of aliens in immigration proceedings. Here the Court has - at
least until very recently - been baldfaced in denying its institutional
competence.22 Due process and equal protection have midget status in
this jurisprudence, stuck in a late nineteenth-century analytic deeply
antithetical to modern constitutional values.
Against this backdrop, Aleinikoff argues for abandoning the
plenary power doctrine and for readjusting the status of these consti
tutionally marginalized communities and their relationship with the
national government. Residents of Puerto Rico and legal resident
20. See p. 78. Although Aleinikoff highlights these disparities, it should be noted that
differentials are also found in welfare benefits as among the states. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 494 (1999) (describing variations in welfare benefit levels).
21. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 1305 (1996) (denying noncitizens certain federal benefits); City of Chicago v. Sha
lala, 1 89 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding denials against due process challenge); see also
MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY PASSEL, THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM'S
IMMIGRANT PROVISIONS (Urb. Inst. Discussion Paper No. 02-03, 2002) (delineating contin
ued impact of denials notwithstanding restoration of some benefits).
22. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Sh aughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as the alien denied entry is
concerned."). Although permanent resident aliens have been afforded procedural due proc
ess protections, see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), they have been denied a host of
other significant rights, on the theory that deportation comprises a civil proceeding, not a
punishment. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 6, at 24-27.
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aliens should be eligible for federal benefits on par with nonterritorial
citizens (p. 80). Resident aliens should enjoy expanded procedural
constitutional protections in immigration proceedings; Aleinikoff
suggests that substantive due process, completely absent from the
immigration context, should preclude the deportation of long-term
resident aliens (p. 175). As for Puerto Rico and the tribes, Aleinikoff
calls for their empowerment as distinct communities, so that relevant
federal decisionmaking is not a matter of diktat but rather of negotia
tion. In Aleinikoff's view, the compact emerges as the appropriate
model for governance here, incorporating notions of mutual consent
(p. 90). On the tribal side, this critically includes the granting of more
completely sovereign territorial jurisdiction for tribal authorities on
reservations.
On its own terms, most of this is well taken. In the immigration
context, few scholars argue for the perpetuation of plenary power.
Even the Court seems finally to have taken the cue, with two 2001
decisions that could mark the first signs of a serious retreat from the
doctrine.23 It is also in the immigration context that the end of plenary
power would have the clearest consequences. With the participation of
the judiciary, the rights of aliens would be more expansively
conceived. (As Aleinikoff points out, Congress does already extend
important protections to aliens, even in the absence of judicial
command.) Having stayed off the playing field for so many years, the
courts would no doubt take some time to regain their footing, and
doctrinal instability would be the medium-term result. But there is no
significant competing rights value complicating this process. Extending
aliens greater rights may have to be contextualized - not every visa
denial, for instance, may merit judicial review - but the workout is
not so different than it is with respect to the extension of other
government benefits.24
23. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (applying standard equal protection analysis
in upholding gender differential in naturalization provision); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001) (interpreting Immigration Act provision as not authorizing the indefinite deten
tion of removable aliens so as to avoid constitutional doubt); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, De
taining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
365 (2002) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power] (describing significance of 2001
cases); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339
(2002) (same). The Supreme Court's more recent 5-4 decision in Demore v. Kim, 1 23 .s. Ct.
1708 (2003), concededly casts doubt on this trajectory. Demore upheld a measure providing
for the mandatory detention of certain aliens in removal proceedings, with an opinion reaf
firming core premises of plenary power. See id. at 1 717 ("[T]his Court has firmly and repeat
edly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be un
acceptable if applied to citizens."). The Zadvydas decision stands nonetheless as evidence
that plenary power over immigration is now at least contested, in holding that the immigra
tion power is subject to "important constitutional limitations." See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
695; see also Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power, supra, at 366 ("(This] laconic, astonish
ingly casual, phrase, may represent a radical shift, a turning point" in immigration law.).
24. Mathews v. Eldridge would provide a starting point for such a contextualized analy
sis, at least with respect to procedural due process. See 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing i nter-
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Not so with the territories and tribes. These contexts implicate
competing community interests in self-governance. Take questions of
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. In the name of plenary power,
the Supreme Court has as a general matter recognized tribal jurisdic
tion over non-Native Americans only to the extent Congress has
expressly extended it.25 The Court has on this basis rejected criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers in all cases. On the one hand, this is
obviously limiting of self-government, for it makes tribal law incom
pletely effective on tribal land, even when tribal members are impli
cated. On the other hand, there are nontrivial arguments against
extending jurisdiction over individuals who enjoy no participation
rights in the relevant polity. Whether one characterizes them as race
based polities or, more politely, as "communities of descent," indi
viduals lacking the requisite ancestry are absolutely barred from
membership.
This gives rise to what Aleinikoff acknowledges to be a possible
democratic deficit, an argument that has figured in the Court's
orientation on this issue.26 But Aleinikoff ultimately argues for the full
recognition of tribal territorial jurisdiction over nonmembers. He first
plays the sovereignty card, to the tribes' benefit. Aleinikoff finds his
title line, "semblance of sovereignty,'' in the current state of Native
American law (p. 98). He asserts that contrary to this jurisprudence, a
"common-sense notion of sovereignty" includes authority to regulate
all reservation residents (p. 100); sovereignty "must at least begin with
the assumption that all persons within the sovereign's borders are
subject to its jurisdiction"(p. 145). Aleinikoff here draws on well
established national and international law rules of territorial j urisdic
tion. The Californian or Italian who visits New York is of course
subject to substantive criminal jurisdiction for any conduct undertaken
therein, even though she will not have participated in the formulation
of the legal regime to which she is subject.
That doesn't completely answer the democratic process objection.
The Californian who establishes residence in New York is afforded a
political voice in New York. Aleinikoff here tries to situate tribal
membership rules in the context of national citizenship rules,
highlighting other countries whose citizenship operates on a descent
ests of beneficiary and government, along with the additional accuracy resulting from addi
tional process, in assessing procedural due process in the context of denied government
benefits); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (applying Eldridge in limited context of
returning permanent resident alien). The consequences of deploying substantive due process
are less easily calculated, though one could expect the courts to be at least as restrained in
applying it to immigration and alienage as they are in other contexts.

25.
26.

See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.

191 (1978).
676, 693 (1990) (denying tribal criminal jurisdiction

over non-Native Americans on grounds that it would result in "trial by political bodies that
do not include them").
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basis. The tribes are legitimated, in this view, as just another among
many "intergenerational polities" (p. 144), which "help[s] allay con
cerns about race-based governance" (p. 146). This ignores the fact that
descent is a nonexclusive mechanism for citizenship allocation;
naturalization is now possible in all countries, and there is a trend
towards adoption of the jus soli rule under which most or all persons
born in national territory become citizens by that fact alone, regardless
of parentage.27 The Italian who moves to New York as a lawful
permanent resident will most likely be eligible for naturalization after
a period of five years; her children born in New York will have United
States citizenship at birth. Tribal membership in that important
respect is unlike the citizenship practices of any state. Aleinikoff
ultimately answers the democratic deficit objection by highlighting the
Indian Civil Rights Act,28 under which most of the Bill of Rights are
applied to the tribes, and makes a suggestion for providing alternate
channels for nonmember participation in tribal governance (p. 148).
And while Aleinikoff would extend tribal territorial jurisdiction to
include jurisdiction over nonmembers, he would maintain federal
power over the reservations to enforce environmental protection,
health, and labor standards.
This is all sustainable as a policy matter. How citizenship provides
the metric is not as obvious. The resulting scheme "decenters"
national citizenship to the extent that it confers a special status on
some American citizens (tribal members) and refuses to adopt a
"leveling" model of citizenship that denies the legitimacy of these and
other differentials.29 But this is not so much a question of decentering
citizenship as one of conceiving citizenship to account for difference,
an example of liberalism meeting multiculturalism halfway. In this
strain, citizenship promotes cultural self-determination at the same
time that it continues to provide the common bond of the national
community.30 Interpreting citizenship to facilitate group autonomy
becomes a way of saving citizenship as an institution. The implication
is that if citizenship does not move to accommodate group difference,
it may become unstable. Aleinikoff is in this respect protective of the
institution, and the exercise is a retreat from thicker, cultural concep
tions of citizenship to a more defensible perimeter.

27. See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality
laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 8, at 17.
28. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000).
29. It is in this guise, Aleinikoff argues, that citizenship has been revived by the
Rehnquist Court as a vehicle for resisting multicul turalism and other group-oriented distinc
tions, including diversity preferences. See pp. 7, 66-70.
30. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, DISSENT, Winter 1994,
at 67.
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IN TERROGATING CITIZENSHIP

In this light, the postnational challenge becomes unavoidable.31
Citizenship may not provide the answers; it may not even provide the
starting point. The interrogation can be undertaken from inside and
outside the institution, considering matters of both inclusion and
exclusion. Both lines help locate the place of citizenship in the face of
globalization, and point, perhaps, to the possible demotion from its
primacy as a marker of human community.
On the inside, Aleinikoff takes as a given that tribal residents of
the reservations and residents of Puerto Rico should remain American
citizens. This assumption is an unsurprising one. It is a basic liberal
tenet that a country's resident population should be more or less
congruent with its citizenry.32 Insofar as these communities have
expressed a preference to remain a part of the United States,
moreover, the persistence of their national citizenship is sanctioned by
liberalism's autonomy values, under which individuals are extended
maximum powers freely to shape their own identities. On this score,
Aleinikoff is careful to highlight the apparent lack of any significant
support for independence among Puerto Rican voters. As a practical
and policy matter, of course, there are no serious moves to modify the
regime under which Native Americans and Puerto Ricans are
extended citizenship at birth.
But this premise can no longer go unexamined. There are contexts,
first of all, in which the congruency thesis and autonomy norm are
being put into opposition. Some Puerto Ricans have attempted to
renounce their U.S. citizenship while remaining resident in Puerto
Rico.33 A serious argument is being made by Native American
31. In anthropologist Arjun Appadurai's conception, postnationalism posits the emer
gence of "formations for allegiance and identity" beyond the nation state; "the steady ero
sion of the capabilities of the nation state to monopolize loyalty will encourage the spread of
national forms that are largely divorced from territorial states." ARJUN APPADURAI,
MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 169 (1996); see also
YASEMIN N. SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994) (deploying the term "postnational" to describe global con
text in which rights are no longer contingent on citizenship).
32. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 62 (1983). It is this premise that
points liberals to a low threshold for naturalization. See id. ("]E]very new immigrant, every
refugee taken in, every resident and worker must be offered the opportunities of citizen
ship."); see also, e.g., RAINER BAUBOCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP
AND RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 92 (1994) (arguing for naturalization at op
tion of resident alien; "(t]he capacity to be a citizen of a liberal democracy must in principle
be ascribed to any person who has not given strong evidence of the contrary in speech or
deeds"); Joseph H. Carens, Why Naturalization Should Be Easy: A Response to Noah
Pickus, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141 (Noah
M.J. Pickus ed., 1998).
33. See Lozado Colon v. United States Dep't of State, 2 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 1 998)
(refusing to review Secretary of State's failure to issue certificate of loss of nationality to in
dividual seeking to renounce U.S. citizenship while remaining resident in Puerto Rico).
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theorists that extending U.S. citizenship to tribal members at birth is
destructive of Native American identity.34 Insofar as these sentiments
gain wider currency, they will test liberal theorists and policymakers.
Indeed, liberalism will be hard pressed to supply a reason why indi
viduals who no longer wish to be identified as American should not be
allowed to actuate that preference. The response can't be that indi
viduals will use a renunciation option to shirk the obligations of
citizenship, because - with the minor exception of jury duty - there
aren't any.35 Nor can the argument concern rights where the individual
has opted to forego them (and in any case the additional rights of citi
zenship are also minimal, with the exception of locational security36).
Citizenship is distilled to an expression of identity. Given that the
rejection of the national identity does not directly burden others, it is
not clear on what basis an exit option could be refused.37
Even if few individuals were to exercise the option, the possibility
puts the citizenship premise into play, creating some affirmative
burden to describe and justify citizenship's content. If citizenship is
about identity, a conception to which Aleinikoff assents,38 then what is
34. See, most notably, Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of
the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon
Indigenous Peoples, 1 5 HARV. BLACKLETIER L.J. 107 (1999).
35. Permanent resident aliens shoulder the two major historical obligations of citizen
ship - taxes and military service - on essentially the same basis as citizens. See 26 U.S.C. §
7701 (a)(30) (2003) (equating citizens and residents for income tax purposes); 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 453 (2003) (providing that all males residing in the United States must register with Selec
tive Service); 50 U.S.C. app. § 454(a) (2003) (providing that all persons subject to registra
tion requirement are liable for military training and service); 26 CFR § 1.1-l(b) (2003)
(income tax imposed on resident aliens).
36. That is, citizens are immune from removal from U.S. territory, where noncitizens
can be subject to deportation. For most aliens, however, this is not a direct burden, insofar as
the grounds for removal (and its enforcement) are limited. A lack of political power is typi
cally also asserted as a disability of alienage, and it is true that with minor exceptions aliens
lack the franchise. But this does not by any means translate into a lack of political power.
Resident aliens are permitted to make campaign contributions. See 2 U.S.C. § 441 (e) (2003)
(excluding permanent resident aliens from prohibition on campaign contributions by foreign
nationals). They also exercise political influence through ethnic communities, unions, corpo
rations, and other elements of civil society. One manifestation of the power that even un
documented aliens are able to bring to bear are the periodic amnesties extended to those
lacking legal immigration status. See, e.g., Nancy Cleeland, Labor Enlists Mexico as A mnesty
Ally, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2001, at Cl.
37. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 122-25 (1985) (calling for facilitated voluntary
expatriation even where United States remains place of residence).
38. Aleinikoff acknowledges this implicitly by asserting that resident aliens should be
entitled to almost all the rights of citizenship. Seep. 179 (drawing "a picture of overlapping
circles, one constituted by citizens who 'belong to America' and another that includes per
sons who are subjects of U.S. sovereign power and the beneficiaries of rights under the laws
and Constitution of the United States"). As Aleinikoff writes elsewhere in attempting to
reconcile multiculturalism with nationalism,
What the unum has a right to ask of the pluribu.1·
. is that groups identify themselves as
American.... [T)he central idea is that a person be committed to this country's continued
.

.
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left of citizenship when the identity is abandoned? Given their group
historical experience as part of the United States, Native Americans
and Puerto Ricans might well not share a "sentiment of belonging to
the land and people of [the American] national state," and might well
not care to participate in it as "an ongoing historical project."39 As
rational actors, tribes and territories may wish to maintain their status
as part of the United States, insofar as it brings net inflows of public
funds and permits unrestricted access to United States territory.40
Those instrumental group interests, however, would not seem to
evidence any sentimental tie to the national community.
Of course, in the liberal perception at least, the tribes and Puerto
Rico in fact sustain strong sentimental ties to the United States. One
could not deny the self-assertion of such ties, as a matter of autono
mous identity, and insofar as there is substantial territorial and familial
intermixing, one would expect the ties to be significant. But from here
one can launch the external problematization of the citizenship
concept. For there are many other individuals and groups which now
maintain substantial ties to the United States, also through territorial
and familial intermixing.41 And yet, of course, many of these indivi
duals and groups are excluded from the circle of citizens, those ties
notwithstanding. It is all very well to argue that residents of Puerto
Rico should receive welfare benefits at the same level as residents of
flourishing and see himself or herself as part of that ongoing project. The allegiance, the
common identification, need not be exclusive, but it must be paramount.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Multicultural Nationalism?, AM. PROSPECT, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at
80, 85.

39. P. 1 78. In both cases, of course, absorption into U.S. territory resulted from military
conquest. A solid argument (albeit transhistorical} can be made that Native Americans were
the victims of genocide on the part of U.S. authorities. See, e.g., Rennard Strickland, Geno
cide-At-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View. of the Native American Experience, 34
KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986). Nor was the acquisition and maintenance of U.S. control over
Puerto Rico driven by benign motives. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, The Bitter Roots of Puerto
Rican Citizenship, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 4, at 373 (describing race
based justifications for the initial terms of control and theory of "incorporation").
40. See Angel Ricardo Oquendo, Puerto Rican National Identity and United States Plu
ralism, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 4, at 315, 316 ("Most Puerto Ricans
prefer to continue or strengthen rather than cut off their bond to the U.S. federation pri
marily in order to secure monetary support from and free access to the United States.").
41. As Aleinikoff points out, forty percen� of all Puerto Ricans live in the mainland
United States. P. 92. But similar figures can be found among other nations, significant
portions of whose citizens are now found in the United States. For example, an estimated
42,000 natives of G renada are resident in the United States. See U.S. Bureau of the Census,
March 2000 Current Population Survey, available at http://www.census.gov/population/
socdemo/foreign/ppl-145/tab03-4.pdf. Grenada itself has a population of 89,000; one can thus
(inexactly) assert that a third of all Grenadians live in the United States. In the same order
of magnitude, one finds for instance Guyana with more than 200,000 natives resident in the
United States as against 700,000 back home, and Belize, for which the figures are 60,000
against 260,000. Almost eight percent of all Mexican natives live in the United States, see id.,
a figure that no doubt rises substantially when calculated for certain subnational Mexican
units with a large immigrant presence in the United States ..
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the fifty states. But why is it that Mexican citizen residents of Juarez
receive nothing? They are likely to have deep connections to ·the
United States, including multiple family ties, and they will certainly
have a stake in American policymaking at all levels, local (El Paso),
state (Texas), and federal. They are also likely to have "common
sympathies" with the American national community, and may even
have a sense of shared political antecedents, particularly as defined by
U.S. citizens of Hispanic origin. They surely share a common popular
culture. And yet they are denied inclusion as citizens.
This critique accepts citizenship as consequential. Rather than
asking why anyone would be interested in citizenship, it asks how one
can justify exclusion from citizenship's benefits. The answer, once
again, is hardly obvious, although most would reflexively defend the
practice of such exclusion. If an individual wants to be a part of that
ongoing historical project, on what grounds can she be denied partici
pation? It is, after all, a core tenet of the American creed that belong
ing is a matter of will rather than of race, culture, or religion.42 This
dominant universalist conception of American citizenship does not
readily supply a basis for excluding those who would like to join.
In the past, territorial location did a lot of unheralded work in
making this universalist orientation possible. America was a project
that anyone could join - but first you had to get here. Otherwise a
status readily acquired, the most formidable threshold to naturaliza
tion has always been residency.43 In the old world, this limitation was
justified on many fronts. In the absence of significant immigration
controls, residency was not legally obstructed. In a world in

42. See. e.g., Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in CONCEPTS OF
ETHNICITY 57 , 62 (William Petersen et al. eds. , 1982) ("the universalist ideological character
of American nationality meant that it was open to anyone who willed to become an Ameri
can"). This universalism is stock-in-trade in American political discourse. See, e.g., Inaugural
Address of President George W. Bush, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 209 (Jan. 26, 2001)
("The grandest of [American] ideals is an unfolding American promise that everyone
belongs, that everyone deserves a chance, that no insignificant person was ever born . . . .
America has never been united by blood or birth or soil. We are bound by ideals that move
us beyond our backgrounds, lift us above our interests, and teach us what it means to be citi
zens."); Presidential Commencement Address at Portland State University, 34 WKLY.
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1120, 1124 (June 13, 1998) (President Clinton asserting that regardless of
where a person comes from , "if you believe in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, if you accept the responsibilities as well as the rights embedded in them, then
you are an American").
43. This, of course, leaves aside America's glaring historical racial eligibility require
ments for naturalization, not fully repealed until 1952. See generally IAN F. HANEY-L6PEZ,
WHITE BY LAW (1996) (describing history of racial barriers to naturalization). This also
brackets elements of the citizenship regime that discriminated on the basis of gender. See,
e.g., CANDICE L. BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998). As Rogers Smith observes, "for over 80 percent of U.S.
history, American laws declared most people in the world ineligible to become full U.S. citi
zens solely because of their race, original nationality, or gender." ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC
IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 15 (1997).
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which democracy was an outlier, presence in the United States was a
necessary condition to the assimilation of constitutional values and
cultural understandings. From abroad, one could not likely participate,
in any substantial way, in the affairs of the national community. In
short, it would not have been possible to "belong" while somewhere
other than on American soil.
Today, territorial location supplies a less effective limitation on
ostensibly universalist theories of American citizenship. The costs of
mobility have declined precipitously. Global travel is now within the
reach of many; for most, securing passage hardly requires selling the
proverbial farm. The problem is not so much getting here, for the
border has become ever more porous (to illegal and legal immigrants
alike), as it is establishing the necessary legal permanent residency. In
contrast to prior great migrations, this leaves the quandary of substan
tial· populations of out-of-status aliens, deprived of significant rights
but also ineligible to naturalize. Nor is presence a critical premise to
belonging, however defined. Democratic values are now pervasive (if
not always respected), so that one can assume familiarity with their
fundamentals regardless of location. Indeed, the familiarity of many
nonresident noncitizens far surpasses the basic principles of American
constitutionalism, to include the nitty gritty of American politics.44 All
the more so with American popular culture. American television
stations are now a standard element in foreign cable packages (and
not just in Europe);45 American movies and entertainment groups
dominate global box offices;46 American iconography is near universal.
In these respects, one can be an "American" without ever setting foot
on United States territory. Assimilation is occurring on a nonterrito
rial basis.
This external acculturation is girded by other forms of connection
to and stakes in the United States. Physical proximity may make
Juarez the easy example, but as the notion of borderlands becomes
increasingly untethered from territorial location, it is not only those at
the frontiers that will have significant interests in this country. The
communications and travel revolutions have spawned new diasporas.
Unlike their historical precursors, which were driven by exile and
despair, the new diasporas reflect the possibilities for persistent,
territorially unbounded communities, ones which transcend national

44. See, e.g., Barry Newman, Foreign Legions: Lots of Noncitizens Feel Right at Home in
U.S. Political Races, WALL ST. J., OCT. 31, 1997, at Al (noting phenomenon of "DOA" -

Democrat on Arrival - among immigrants to the United States).
45. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Global Village Idiocy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1 2, 2002, § 4,
at 15 (reporting the Fox News is now part of the Djakarta cable television package).
46. See, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS 355 (1999) (statistics
showing global dominance of film industry by U.S. entities); id. at 359-60 (same, for televi
sion industry).
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borders and spatial distance.47 As a country of continuing in-migration,
these communities are of course represented in the United States. But
it is not only those members who are present that will have interests
here. I may be a resident of New Delhi and citizen of India, but if I
have siblings, aunts, uncles, and cousins in the United States, work for
an American-based company and own stock in others, and am subject
to various elements of American law, I have a stake in America. I am
in some sense a part of the American national community.
But that is a position that the citizenship binary cannot compre
hend. Liberal nationalist attempts to prop citizenship up invariably
take aim at the d�privation of rights of those territorially present.
Aleinikoff's call for the extension of near-complete constitutional
rights to permanent resident aliens is an example of this strategy.48
Thus widening the circle of rights (effectively widening the circle of
citizens, though not by means of the status itself49) will not, however,
resolve the exclusionary aspects of citizenship. The approach is
problematic even if one accepts locational determinism. Bringing
permanent resident aliens into the fold leaves hanging, most notably,
the status of undocumented immigrants, whose constitutional
status Aleinikoff does not address. Some - but by no means all undocumented aliens have been territorially present for long periods
of time, and have accrued the same sort of obvious stake in continued
residence as have lawful permanent resident aliens. And yet it is not
easy to extend the circle to them on the basis of territorial presence;
for many, the presence will be episodic or transient. Indeed, the pres
ence of many permanent resident aliens is also episodic (as it is for an
increasing number of citizens, who move abroad while retaining their
citizenship status50). It is inconsistent with liberal paradigms of rights
and democracy to leave the long-present undocumented alien without
secure legal status, but it's not clear how to adjust the citizenship
paradigm to address the challenge.
47. See, e.g., APPADURAI, supra note 31, at 158-77 (1996); Anupam Chander, Diaspora
Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005 (2001).
48. See OWEN FISS, A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
OF NEW AMERICANS (1999) (calling for elimination of all soci al disabilities imposed on
aliens within the United States); Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the
Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 1285 (2002) (posing the "citizenship of aliens"); David
A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and
Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 208-34 (1983) (setting forth the "circles of membership"
model in which resident aliens are afforded almost all rights enjoyed by citizens).
49. See p. 172 ("[O]ne can understand constitutional membership as extending to all
.
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States even if the document privileges citizen
ship in certain respects.").
50. Short of becoming a head-of-state of another nation, as a matter of law and practice
U.S. citizenship will not be terminated save where termination is specifically intended by the
citizen (that is, where it is expressly renounced). See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the
Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1454-55 (1977).
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Nor can citizenship possibly process the status of those who do
not venture into United States territory at all but who have ties to it
nonetheless. It is not clear why territorial location should be determi
native of rights. It is true that physical presence in the United States
makes more likely the accretion of sentimental and other stakes in
America, but as suggested above, one's placement relative to national
frontiers no longer necessarily corresponds to the existence or
magnitude of such interests. Insofar as stake and identity emerge on a
nonterritorial basis, it is difficult - at least when one starts from the
liberal principles - to support the denial of rights and benefits to
those who just happen to be on the wrong side of the border. But of
course citizenship cannot supply the answer to this challenge, for there
would be no practical way of sorting out the spectrum of nonterritorial
stake and of deciding at what point a nonterritorially present individ
ual would qualify.
This poses a challenge not only to citizenship but to liberalism
more generally. In the end, liberalism is premised on a society that is
territorially defined, on a group of residents within a defined space
who share an equal voice in their own territorially based self
government. In this sense, liberalism is contingent on the persistence
of sovereignty as both a legal and social construct. Sovereignty made
states all-powerful in their own realm, with correspondingly severe
limitations on their capacities in the realm of others. Sovereignty, in
short, made for ·the primacy of national boundaries, which in turn
made credible liberalism's assumption of territorial closure.51
Aleinikoff observes that " [w]ithout a notion of citizenship, sovereignty
has no home" (p. 169). But the reverse proposition may be more
sustainable; it may be sovereignty that gives citizenship a home.
Indeed, sovereignty does a lot of work for Aleinikoff. Where he gives
virtually no substantive content to citizenship, sovereignty echoes
around the argument. In distinguishing Native American tribes from
foreign nations, for instance, Aleinikoff asserts that the United States
"has no power to impose legal rules within foreign borders" (p. 141).
In justifying widening the circle of right�-holders to include resident
aliens, he speaks of establishing a "political regime that . . . justly rules
over the territory and inhabitants of the United States."52 These sover
eignty-based understandings quietly support an analytical framework
that stops at the water's edge.

5 1 . Rawls, most notably, assumed a society in which entry was only through birth, exit
through death. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 12 (1993).
52. P. 183; see also p. 4 (defining sovereignty to "mean the supreme legal authority in a
national state," and national state "to mean a political organization exercising sovereignty
over a bounded territory"); p. 193 (describing citizenship as "an important joint venture, on
a defined piece of territory").
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But sovereignty has become at the least a more elastic proposition,
if it remains useful at all, and the tenet of exclusive, delimited territo
rial rule is increasingly obsolete. The United States regulates a
growing quantum of conduct that occurs in foreign territory, j ust as
there are now many entities (including foreign states and international
institutions) that regulate conduct in the United States.53 Aleinikoff
himself deploys "flexible" notions of sovereignty to defend his vision
of self-determination for Puerto Rico, appropriately suggesting that
there may be space for "autonomous" entities within the American
constitutional system.54 But sovereignty is becoming · flexible at the
external, global level as well. The domains of various legal regimes,
including national ones, no longer coincide with national boundaries.
Indeed, many regimes transcend space altogether, in the sense that
they are not territorially contingent. Without sovereignty, territorially
insulated self-government becomes an impossibility, at least at
anything beyond the local level. In the face of spatial integration,
national governance must reach beyond national borders in order to
be effective.
Unless those affected by the extraterritorial extension are given a
full voice in decisionmaking, the result is something other than self
government on the basis of equality. After sovereignty, equality thus
appears no longer to present a viable premise for governance.
Equality requires boundedness,55 but public governance can no longer
be delivered on a bounded basis. Without equality, moreover, it is
difficult to sustain democracy, at least not in its standard "one person,
one vote" conception.56 That is part of the initial constitutional
quandary posed by the deprivation of federal voting rights for
residents of Puerto Rico and territorially present aliens.57 There is no
53. Antitrust regulation presents an example. See, e. g. , Roger P. Alford, The Extraterri
torial A pplication of Antitrust Laws: The United States and European Community Ap
proaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1 992). The United States increasingly applies its criminal law
to activities occurring outside the United States, a necessity in an era of increasingly transna
tional criminal networks. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26
YALE J. INT'L L. 305 (2002) (describing growing body of transnational law in various areas
of law).
54. P. 93 ; see also p. 5 (arguing for "understandings of sovereignty and membership that
are supple and flexible, open to new arrangements that complement the evolving nature of
the modern state"); p. 1 86 (highlighting recent international developments as demonstrating
that "sovereignty is a relative, not an absolute, concept - layered and shared and compli
cated").
55. As Aleinikoff observes, in the context of describing Warren Court jurisprudence,
citizenship is "not just a status that guarantee[s] equality," it is "a place where equality [can]
exist." P. 56.
56. For an account questioning this standard metric of democratic process, see Grant M.
Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2003).
57. The status of residents of the District of Columbia presents another population that
falls in a constitutional "anomalous zone," to use Gerald Neuman's felicitous phrase, see
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clear liberal answer to this challenge, either.58 Aleinikoff, among
others, stops short of advocating federal voting rights for either group.
But it is tough to justify the denial of the franchise on liberal prin
ciples, especially to long-resident aliens. As noted above, territorially
present aliens shoulder all significant obligations of citizenship, and
are subject to the authority of the state. As a part of the governed,
liberal axioms would hold, they should have an equal voice in the
government. Liberal attempts to justify this political disability are
either formalistic or circular. Owen Piss asserts, for instance, that the
political exclusion of aliens rests "on the idea that the nation is a
community, not just a geographically bounded territory, and, like any
such voluntary organization, this community requires rules of mem
bership and vests the power of governance in those lawfully admitted
to membership."59 As an operative principle, however, that proposi
tion would leave membership decisions unconstrained, and (to the ex
tent it results in the exclusion of some territorially present individuals)
stands in clear tension with the bedrock of self-government, defined as
authority over a particular piece of territory. For his part, Aleinikoff
doesn't explain head on why aliens should be excluded from the
franchise.60 One must extrapolate from his conception of citizenship as
an "idea of belonging" (p. 178) that the lack of identity and commit
ment justifies the denial of political rights. B ut, again, it's not clear
how that conforms with liberal premises of equal self-government and
autonomous self-identification.
Questions at the constitutional margins, then, put the entire
project into doubt. Liberalism seems incapable of rationalizing consti
tutional exclusion. Nothing short of actual universalism would resolve
the contradictions of equality and self-governance inherent in such
exclusion. And yet actual universalism would represent the death of
American citizenship, for citizenship has no meaning in the absence of
difference. So we are left with a citizenship based on something other
than liberalism. Rogers Smith has shown us that citizenship's past was

Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 1 97 (1996). Although extended
the right to vote in presidential elections under the Twenty-Third .Amendment, residents of
the District continue to lack direct representation in Congress. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Is
This America? The District of Columbia and the Right to Vote, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
39 (1999).
SR See Mark Tushnet, Partial Membership and Political Theory, in FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 4, at 209, 220 (finding status of Puer�o Rican residents at least
"in tension" with liberal political theory, and possibly evidencing that "liberal political the
ory is only one of the traditions to which the United States is committed").

59. See FISS, supra note 48, at 19-20.
60. Indeed, it is only by implication that he rejects the federal franchise for aliens. See,
e.g., p. 193 ("]N]either the extension of rights nor novel political arrangements at the local
level pose a risk to the robustness of national U.S. sovereignty.").
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hardly liberal, the mythology of inclusion notwithstanding.61 What of
its future? Perhaps we had better devise adaptations to standard
liberal formulas. Indeed, Aleinikoff himself contemplates innovative
strategies for overcoming issues of exclusion. He suggests, for
example, that nontribal residents of Native American lands be
afforded some voice in reservation governance through nonvoting
representation in tribal councils, a proposal oriented more to commu
nitarian conceptions of political justice than individualistic liberal
ones. The proposed compact-based relationships with the tribes and
territories presents another model deviating from standard liberal
approaches, which have difficulty processing political arrangements
formally undertaken on a group basis.
III. THE AMERICAN ENDING
There remains the looming question of what remains of American
citizenship once it abandons its liberal foundations. At the same time
that Aleinikoff purports to decenter citizenship, he assumes its viabil
ity and desirability as an organizing principle of society. " [C]itizenship
does and should matter" (p. 177). Aleinikoff effectively concedes a
thin version of the institution: "Citizenship does not guarantee a
common culture for Americans," he observes, "it provides the
common calling of being American" (p. 195). But what exactly that
common calling consists of, what it means to "belong to America," is
left largely unexplored. There is the standard invocation of the
national project,62 but we are given no idea, beyond historical ante
cedents, of what distinctively defines that project. Multiculturalism, by
itself, can hardly provide a bond insofar as it celebrates difference
rather than commonality.63 Perhaps most significantly, now that consti
tutional democracy represents a prevalent global norm, political
culture no longer sets the American nation apart from others in a way
that it clearly once did.64 Michael Lind's ni:w American ethnicity based
61. SMITH, supra note 43 (challenging historical, liberal accounts of U.S. citizenship

practices).
62. Such explanations of national identity date back to John Stuart Mill, the original lib
eral nationalist. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 427 (199 1 ) (observing that the strongest national roots are found in the
"identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent com
munity of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with
incidents of the past"); see also, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF
AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 146 (1998) ("Above all, history
can give a sense of national identity."); SMITH, supra note 43, at 496-97 (articulating concept
of the "party of America," based on the nation's "rich and distinctive" history).
63. See APPADURAI, supra note 31 , at 171.
64. For liberals, at least, political culture has bound Americans together at the same
time that it set them apart from others. See, e.g., M ICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO
BE AN AMERICAN 29 ("If the manyness of America is cultural, its oneness is political.");
Kenneth L. Karst, The Bonds of American Nationhood, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 141, 1 1 60
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on the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, Abraham Lincoln, and the Statue
of Liberty65 hardly seems sufficient to sustain a primary identity.
As the identity erodes, so too does the normative basis for citizen
ship and its inherently exclusionary features. Citizenship is not a self
justifying practice. Insofar as it is consequential, there must be some
underlying basis for membership criteria. Territorial location may no
longer supply an orienting point for membership decisions. Nor can
the formality of citizenship by itself sustain a national community that
rests on otherwise fraying bonds.
"If there is something new as the new century begins," writes
Aleinikoff, "it is the ascendancy of citizenship" (p. 72). This may not
hold true on the ground; as this Review has suggested, one might on
the contrary assert its increasing instability and eventual demise. But
whichever proposition prevails, Semblances of Sovereignty attests to
the serious scholarly sights now being trained on citizenship and its
constitutional place.
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